From 1949 to 1966, the NBA Draft featured “territorial picks,” a peculiar system. While draft order was generally based on standings, teams could forfeit their pick to select a local player, one who grew up or played college ball nearby. Twenty-three players were chosen this way, a dozen of whom reached the Hall of Fame. The NBA, aiming to cultivate regional loyalty early on, aimed to place star players in cities that strongly desired them. This system, sensible for its time, was also easily manipulated.
Wilt Chamberlain`s biography, `Larger than Life,` reveals Red Auerbach`s plan to have Chamberlain attend college in New England, allowing the Celtics to draft him. Though this didn`t happen, Auerbach found other ways to exploit the rules. In 1956, he acquired Tommy Heinsohn and Bill Russell in the same draft, without needing to actually pick Heinsohn. As a Holy Cross standout, Auerbach could forgo his late first-round pick to take Heinsohn. He then traded veterans Ed Macauley and Cliff Hagan for Russell. Macauley was available to trade because the St. Louis Bombers used a territorial pick to get him in 1949 before folding a year later. Auerbach acquired Macauley in the subsequent dispersal draft and traded him for Russell. This flawed system laid the foundation for Boston`s dynasty.
Another dynasty was unintentionally built through this system. In 1965, despite losing the NBA Finals to Boston, the Los Angeles Lakers drafted Gail Goodrich. Goodrich won a championship with the Lakers in 1972, and in 1976, he signed with the New Orleans Jazz. Free-agent signings then triggered compensation, earning the Lakers three first-round picks. The last of these, in 1979, became Magic Johnson. While Chamberlain and Oscar Robertson were the system`s biggest stars, these examples show the significant impact of even a single stroke of draft-night luck. Territorial picks heavily shaped the NBA`s first decades.
In 1966, the NBA abolished territorial picks. The sport was becoming national, and fairness outweighed local interests. The draft`s purpose is to balance the league: weaker teams should get better players to compete with stronger ones. This has largely worked, but like the territorial system, the current draft is also being exploited.
The Current Tanking Problem
Tanking, the strategy of losing to secure better draft picks, is a well-known issue. As long as higher picks reward losing, teams will exploit it. An inverse standings-based draft is vital to prevent strong teams from becoming even stronger, making the modern draft model necessary. Tanking can never be fully eliminated.
However, it can be managed. From 1966 to 1984, a coin flip decided the No. 1 pick between the worst two teams. Teams abused this, and Houston`s blatant tanking to get Hakeem Olajuwon in 1984 led to the lottery system a year later. The lottery has been adjusted to combat tanking. In 2019, odds were flattened, giving the top three teams a 14% chance at No. 1, down from 25% for the worst team. Mid-ranked teams got better odds, aiming to reduce the incentive to race to the bottom. The Play-In Tournament also motivated mid-level teams to compete for playoff spots.
These steps are positive, but insufficient given current tanking levels. The Utah Jazz were fined $100,000 for violating player participation rules in their pursuit of the worst record. The Toronto Raptors use a new tactic: playing stars, but benching them late in games. Their top scorers, Barnes, Barrett, and Quickley, rank low in fourth-quarter minutes in March. Quentin Grimes is trying to disrupt Philadelphia`s tanking, but injuries to Embiid, George, and Maxey limit his impact.
Tanking is rational for these teams. Utah can`t improve their No. 1 pick odds (capped at 14%), but they can reduce the chance of falling further. The worst team can drop to No. 5, while the third-worst can fall to No. 7. Philadelphia tanks to protect their pick, which is lost if it falls outside the top six. In the era of superstar trades, this will become more common. Half of 2025 first-round picks are now owned by different teams. If this trend continues, more teams will tank to safeguard picks, as Utah is doing to keep their pick from going to Oklahoma City if it falls outside the top 10 (and top 8 next year).
A Potential Solution: Freeze Lottery Odds
Tanking cannot be entirely stopped while incentives exist. However, each NBA intervention has had some benefit. It`s time for another step. I propose freezing lottery odds at the All-Star break. The 14 non-playoff teams would still be in the lottery, but their odds would be set based on their All-Star break standings.
Why the All-Star break? The 76ers exemplify why. On February 7, Philadelphia`s executive Daryl Morey touted their playoff hopes, saying, “We feel like this team can still [win the championship].” This was just before the break. Then, the 76ers were 20-30. Since then, they are 3-18. Philadelphia started the season aiming to win. Injuries hindered them, but their recent slide worsened once winning seemed impossible.
Is Philadelphia the team we want winning the lottery? Shouldn`t the lottery benefit truly struggling teams, not just the unluckiest or most blatant tankers?
Consider the bottom of the standings. At the All-Star break, the Wizards were 9-45 and the Jazz were 13-41. Since then, the Wizards have improved, going 6-10 post-break – a positive development for a young team building good habits. However, this progress could hurt their draft position because the Jazz are seemingly not playing by the rules, openly tanking.
This puts the Wizards in a difficult spot. The Jazz are likely better and, in a fair season, should have a better record and worse lottery odds. But the Jazz are tanking, potentially punishing the Wizards more than themselves. Despite identical 14% odds at No. 1, any GM would agree $100,000 is worth the risk-mitigation of guaranteeing no worse than the No. 5 pick versus possibly falling to No. 6 or 7. The Wizards might be forced to tank harder to protect their draft interests against the Jazz, choosing between organic growth and manufactured losses – a choice no young team should face.
Tanking breeds more tanking. As more teams do it, the pressure to tank harder increases. This intensifies late in seasons as outcomes become clearer. The 76ers wouldn`t have planned to tank this season. They signed Paul George and had other All-Stars. Their early-season performance was a truer reflection of their team. Their post-Morey quote 12-win pace will impact their draft pick.
Teams will still tank entire seasons, but this is a more honest approach. If a team decides in July to tank for a top pick, it likely needs it. This is planned, and fans and networks can adjust. No one wants unintentional tankers in nationally televised March and April games. Fans might be more willing to buy late-season tickets if teams weren`t incentivized to lose.
This might also encourage teams to keep players they might otherwise trade. Consider the Jazz again. On February 1 in both 2023 and 2024, Utah was in Play-In contention. At both trade deadlines, they traded veterans like Conley, Beasley, Vanderbilt, Olynyk, and Fontecchio, clearly aiming to lose. Utah missed the play-in both years. Is this good? Should fans want teams to trade valuable players mid-season for draft picks?
Nets fans certainly did. Brooklyn paid a premium to regain control of their 2025 and 2026 picks, essentially trading for the right to tank. They didn`t tank effectively enough early on and tried to course-correct by trading Schroder and Finney-Smith mid-season. Fans wanting a top pick wanted more, some even calling to trade Cam Johnson, their second-leading scorer, to ensure more losses. After the deadline, Johnson expressed frustration with tanking fans.
“We do not care what they say about that,” Johnson said on Feb. 12. “Listen, at the end of the day, the 15-18 guys on this team have a job to do; our job is to not try to get a draft pick. Our job is to simply win basketball games, and that`s what we`re gonna put our full effort towards.” In a league concerned with player mental health, tanking pits player interests against team and fan interests.
Grimes is a prime example. He`s entering restricted free agency, seeking generational wealth. His mid-season improvement should be a positive story. But fans can`t fully enjoy it as it might affect their draft position and potential pick like Cooper Flagg.
Teams would still trade players to tank even if odds froze mid-season. Selling often fits a long-term plan, not just short-term tanking. But this system would incentivize offseason trades, which makes more basketball sense and eases player transitions. Moving families in February, during the season and school year, is much harder than in the summer.
Would This Solution Work?
Would freezing odds simply shift tanking to January and February? Likely, somewhat. Some teams would act to secure draft positions earlier, as each loss would matter more in a shorter sample. If draft position is based on 50 games instead of 82, early losses become more crucial.
However, full-season tanking is harder to justify to owners than a late-season “punt.” It`s also harder to execute, as players are healthier in January-February and less willing to sit. Stars want to compete for All-Star spots and playoff contention, even if unrealistic. Shenanigans might still occur, but less blatant than extreme late-season tanking efforts.
This change isn`t perfect, but another step toward curbing tanking`s worst aspects. Fans don`t want to see star players benched late in close games. But the current system encourages this. We can`t eliminate tanking, but we can move toward a more honest system. Determining the worst teams is more accurate by focusing on October-February, as March and April standings at the bottom are often a farce, a race to lose most creatively. Like territorial picks, this system needs to be addressed.
